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We build a directed search model of the labor market in which workers’ transi-
tions between unemployment, employment, and across employers are endogenous.
We prove the existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of a recursive equilibrium with
the property that the distribution of workers across employment states does not
aﬀect the agents’ values and strategies. Because of this property, we are able to
compute the equilibrium outside the non-stochastic steady-state. We use a cali-
brated version of the model to measure the eﬀect of productivity shocks on the US
labor market. We ﬁnd that productivity shocks generate procyclical ﬂuctuations in
the rate at which unemployed workers become employed and countercyclical ﬂuc-
tuations in the rate at which employed workers become unemployed. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that productivity shocks generate large countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the
number of vacancies opened for unemployed workers and even larger procyclical
ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed workers. Overall,
productivity shocks alone can account for 80 percent of unemployment volatility,
30 percent of vacancy volatility and for the nearly perfect negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
From December 1969 to November 1970, the US unemployment rate increased from 3.5
to 6.1 percent. During this period, unemployment increased partly because the workers’
transition rate from unemployment to employment (henceforth, the UE rate) dropped
from 51 to 44 percent per month.1 In part, unemployment increased because the workers’
transition rate from employment to unemployment (henceforth, the EU rate) increased by
30 percent. Similarly, during the 1960, 1973, 1981 and 1990 recessions, the unemployment
rate increased because of both a signiﬁcant decline in the UE rate and a signiﬁcant surge
in the EU rate.
From January 2001 to November 2001, the US vacancy rate fell by approximately
30 percent. During this period, the number of workers moving from unemployment to
employment declined from 3.25 to 3.23 millions per month (a 1 percent decline). In
contrast, the number of workers moving from one employer to the other declined from
4.5 to 3.7 millions per month (a 17 percent decline).2 More generally, over the period
between January 1994 and June 2006 (i.e., the period for which we have data on workers’
transitions from employer to employer), the correlation between the vacancy rate and the
workers’ ﬂow from unemployment to employment is -0.3, while the correlation between
the vacancy rate and the workers’ ﬂow across employers is 0.49.
The ﬁrst set of observations suggests that, in order to study the cyclical ﬂuctuations
of the unemployment rate, an economist should use a model in which both the UE and
EU rates are endogenous. The second set of observations suggests that, in order to study
the ﬂuctuations of the vacancy rate, an economist should use a model in which the hiring
ﬂows of both unemployed and employed workers are endogenous. When taken together,
these observations suggest that, in order to study the dynamics of the labor market at
1In Section 5.1, the reader will ﬁnd the deﬁnitions of the workers’ transition rate from unemployment
to employment, from employment to unemployment, and from employer to employer. Moreover, he will
ﬁnd the deﬁnitions of the unemplyoment and the vacancy rate.
2We measure the number of workers moving from unemployment to employment as the product
between civilian unemployment and the workers’ transition rate from unemployment to employment (as
deﬁned in Section 5.1). Similarly, we measure the number of workers moving from one employer to
the other as the product between civilian employment and the workers’ trasition rate from employer to
employer (as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n5 . 1 ) .
2the business cycle frequency, an economist should use a model that endogenizes the UE
rate, the EU rate, and the rate at employed workers move from one employer to the other
(henceforth, the EE rate).
1.2 Summary
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we construct and analyze a search-theoretic model of
the labor market in which the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment
and across diﬀerent employers are all endogenous. In the second part of the paper, we
calibrate the model in order to match the fundamental features of worker’s turnover in
the US labor market. In the last part of the paper, we use the calibrated model to
measure the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of
US unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables over the period 1951 (I)
-2 0 0 6( I I ) .
In our model, the labor market is populated by ex-ante homogeneous workers, each
endowed with one indivisible unit of labor, and ex-ante homogeneous ﬁrms, each oper-
ating a production technology that turns labor into ﬁnal goods. Moreover, in our model
labor market, trade is the outcome of a search-and-matching process. In particular, ﬁrms
choose how many vacancies to open and how much to oﬀer to the workers who ﬁll them.
Simultaneously, workers choose how much to demand for ﬁlling a vacancy. Then, some of
the workers and the ﬁrms who agree on the terms of trade successfully match and begin
to produce the ﬁnal good. We assume that the productivity of a match is the sum of an
aggregate and an idiosyncratic component.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between opening diﬀerent types of vacancies,
because the vacancies that oﬀer more generous terms of trade attract more workers and,
hence, are easier to ﬁll. Workers, however, have strict preferences over diﬀerent types
of vacancies. In particular, unemployed workers prefer to search for vacancies that oﬀer
less generous terms of trade and are easier to ﬁnd (because they attract fewer workers),
while employed workers prefer to search for vacancies that oﬀer more generous terms of
trade but are harder to ﬁnd. Similarly, workers who are employed in more productive jobs
prefer to search for vacancies that oﬀer better terms of trade. In equilibrium, an employed
3worker becomes unemployed when the idiosyncratic component of the productivity of his
match falls below an endogenous job-destruction threshold.
When a positive shock to the aggregate component of labor productivity hits the
economy, ﬁrms have the incentive to open more vacancies per worker at all diﬀerent
terms of trade. In response to the increase in the vacancy/worker ratio, unemployed
workers and (on average) employed workers search for vacancies that not only oﬀer more
generous terms of trade, but are also easier to ﬁnd. Also, when a positive shock to the
aggregate component of productivity hits the economy, workers and ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal
to keep some of the matches that previously they would have destroyed. Overall, a
positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity tends to increase the UE and
EE rates, and to decrease the EU rate.
In the second part of the paper, we calibrate the model. In particular, we calibrate
the parameters that describe the search technology so that the workers’ average transi-
tion rates between employment, unemployment and across employers are the same in the
model as in the data. We calibrate the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of productivity to approximate the empirical distribution of workers across diﬀerent
t e n u r el e n g t h s . F i n a l l y ,w ec a l i b r a t et h es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s sf o rt h ea g g r e g a t ec o m p o -
nent of productivity so that the average productivity of labor has the same statistical
properties in the model and in the data.
In the third part of the paper, we use the calibrated model to measure the contribution
of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the US labor market. We
ﬁnd that aggregate productivity shocks account for 40 percent of the observed volatility
of the UE rate, and for approximately all of the observed volatility of the EU rate. As
a result, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more than 80 percent of
the observed volatility of unemployment. Moreover, we ﬁnd that productivity shocks
generate countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for unemployed
workers and larger procyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for em-
ployed workers. Overall, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more than
30 percent of the cyclical volatility of the vacancy rate and for their nearly perfectly
negative correlation with unemployment. In light of these ﬁn d i n g s ,w ec o n c l u d et h a ta g -
4gregate productivity shocks may well be the fundamental cause of labor market volatility
in the postwar US.
In the last part of the paper, we measure the contribution of aggregate productivity
shocks to the cyclical volatility of the US labor market using a version of our model in
which the UE rate remains endogenous, but the EU and EE rates are exogenous because
matches are constrained to be homogeneous and workers are constrained to search only
oﬀ the job. This constrained version of our model coincides with the canonical search
model formulated by Pissarides (1985, 2000) and Shimer (2005). We ﬁnd that, when an
economist uses the constrained model, he not only ignores the eﬀect of productivity shocks
on the EU rate, but also underestimates the eﬀect of productivity shocks on the UE rate
because he mismeasures the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
Moreover, when an economist uses the constrained model, he not only ignores the eﬀect
of productivity shocks on the number of vacancies created for employed workers, but
also mismeasures the eﬀect of productivity shocks on the number of vacancies created
for unemployed workers. Finally, when an economist uses the constrained model, he
underestimates the magnitude of productivity shocks in the postwar US. For all of these
reasons, he incorrectly concludes that aggregate productivity shocks account for less than
10 percent of the cyclical volatility of unemployment and for less than 20 percent of the
cyclical volatility of vacancies. These ﬁndings conﬁrm our initial conjecture that, in order
to understand the behavior of unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle, an
economist needs a model in which not only the UE, but also the EU and EE rates are
endogenous.
1.3 Related Literature
In this paper, we develop the ﬁrst stochastic model of the labor market in which workers
s e a r c ho na n do ﬀ the job, and the search process is directed (i.e. workers can choose
whether to search for vacancies that oﬀers more or less generous terms of trade) rather
than random (i.e. workers meet all the vacancies with the same probability). For
this model, we establish two useful properties of the equilibrium. First, we prove that
the equilibrium is “block recursive”; that is, the agents’ values, strategies and the va-
5cancy/applicant ratio depend on the state of the economy only through the realization
of the aggregate productivity shock, and not through the multi-dimensional distribution
of workers across employment states (namely, unemployment and employment at diﬀer-
ent jobs). Because of this property, solving the equilibrium requires solving a system of
functional equations in which the unknown functions are only one-dimensional. Second,
we prove that, as long as employment contracts are complete, the equilibrium allocation
coincides with the solution to the social planner’s problem. Because of this property,
we are able to provide a rich analytical characterization of the equilibrium allocation.
While Shi (2006) had already emphasized the block recursivity of the equilibrium in a
deterministic model of directed search on the job, our paper is the ﬁrst to establish this
property in a stochastic environment.
In models of random search on the job, the equilibrium does not have these attractive
properties (see Mortensen 1994, Pissarides 1994, Burdett and Mortensen 1998, Barlevy
2002, Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002, Burdett and Coles 2003, Menzio 2005, Nagypál
2007). First, in these models, the equilibrium allocation does not coincide with the
solution to the social planner’s problem. Second, in these models, the equilibrium is (in
general) such that the agents’ values, strategies and the vacancy/applicant ratio depend
on the entire distribution of workers across employment states.3 Therefore, solving the
equilibrium of these models outside of steady-state requires solving a system of functional
equations in which the unknown functions have at least as many dimensions as the
number of diﬀerent employment states in which workers can be.
In this paper, we construct the ﬁrst measure of the contribution of aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of US unemployment, vacancies and transition
rates that is based on a model in which the UE, EU and EE rates are endogenous.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Mortensen (1994), Barlevy (2002), and Ramey (2007)
3In models of directed search on the job, workers who are in diﬀerent employment states choose to
search for vacancies that oﬀer diﬀerent terms of trade. Therefore, in these models, the distribution of
workers across employment states has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s expected beneﬁt from creating a particular
type of vacancy and, in turn, on the equilibrium vacancy/worker ratio, and on the workers’ values and
strategies. In contrast, in models of random search on the job, workers who are in diﬀerent employment
states search for the same vacancies. Therefore, as long as diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent reservation
values when they meet a prospective employer, the distribution will aﬀect the ﬁrm’s expected beneﬁt
from creating a vacancy and, in turn, the equilibrium vacancy/worker ratio, and the workers’ values and
strategies.
6develop search-theoretic models of the business cycle in which the EU and UE rates
are endogenous. In these models, as in ours, workers move from employment to unem-
ployment when the idiosyncratic component of productivity of their job falls below an
endogenous destruction threshold. Moreover, as in our model, a positive shock to the
aggregate component of productivity tends to lower the endogenous destruction thresh-
old and, hence, the EU rate. However, none of these papers measures the contribution
of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical volatility of both the UE and EU rates.
In fact, Barlevy (2002) and Ramey (2007) impose the restriction in the calibration that
aggregate productivity shocks account for all of the observed volatility of the EU rate.
In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994) the parameters of the model
are chosen so that aggregate productivity shocks account for all of the unemployment
volatility that is observed in the data.
Mortensen (1994), Pissarides (1994), Nagypál (2007) and Ramey (2007) develop
search-theoretic models of the business cycle in which the UE and EE rates are en-
dogenous. All of these papers conclude that, if an economist uses a model that abstracts
from employer-to-employer transitions, he does not signiﬁcantly underestimate the con-
tribution of productivity shocks to the volatility of the UE rate. In this paper, we reach
av e r yd i ﬀerent conclusion. In particular, we ﬁnd that, if an economist uses a model that
abstracts from EE transitions, he underestimated the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to vacancies by more than 60 percent. For this reason, he underestimates
the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the volatility of the UE rate by more
than 70 percent. While other papers had already noticed this potential source of bias in
the estimation of the elasticity of the matching function (e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides




Time is discrete and continues forever. The economy is populated by a continuum of
workers with measure one and by a continuum of ﬁrms with positive measure. Each
7worker has the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
P∞
t=0 β
tct,w h e r ect ∈ R is the
worker’s consumption in period t and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Each ﬁrm has the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
P∞
t=0 β
tπt,w h e r eπt ∈ R is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
in period t.I nt h i se c o n o m y ,t h el a b o rm a r k e ti so r g a n i z e di nac o n t i n u u mo fs u b m a r k e t s
indexed by x ∈ R,w h e r ex denotes the value oﬀered to a worker in that submarket
(explained further below). In submarket x, the ratio between the number of jobs that
are vacant and the number of workers who are searching is denoted by θ(x) ∈ R+.W e
refer to θ(x) as the tightness of submarket x.4
At the beginning of each period, the state of the economy can be summarized by
the triple (y,u,g) ≡ ψ ∈ Ψ.T h e ﬁrst element of ψ denotes the aggregate component
of labor productivity, y ∈ Y = {y1,y 2,...y Ny},w h e r eNy ≥ 2. The second element
denotes the measure of workers who are unemployed, u ∈ [0,1]. The last element is a
function g : Z → [0,1],w i t hg(z) denoting the measure of workers who are employed at




Each period is divided into four stages: separation, search, matching and production.
During the ﬁrst stage, an employed worker becomes unemployed with probability τ ∈
[δ,1],w h e r eτ is determined by the worker’s labor contract. The lower bound on τ
denotes the probability of exogenous job destruction, δ ∈ (0,1).
During the second stage, a worker gets the opportunity of searching for a job with a
probability that depends on his recent employment history. In particular, if the worker
was unemployed at the beginning of the period, he can search with probability λu ∈ [0,1].
If the worker was employed at the beginning of the period and did not lose his job
during the separation stage, he can search with probability λe ∈ [0,1].I f t h e w o r k e r
lost his job during the separation stage, he cannot search. Conditional on being able
to search, the worker chooses which submarket to visit. Also, during the second stage,
a ﬁr mc h o o s e sh o wm a n yv a c a n c i e st oc r e a t ea n dw h e r et ol o c a t et h e m . T h ec o s to f
maintaining a vacancy for one period is k>0. Both workers and ﬁr m st a k et h et i g h t n e s s
4In submarkets that are not visited by any workers, θ(x) is an out-of-equilibrium conjecture that
helps determine equilibrium behavior.
5Note that the assumption that Y and Z are ﬁnite sets is not necessary for establsihing any of the
theoretical results in this paper. We make this assumption only to simplify the notation.
8θ(x) parametrically.6
During the third stage, the workers and the vacancies in submarket x come together
through a frictional matching process. In particular, a worker ﬁnds a vacant job with
probability p(θ(x)),w h e r ep : R+ → [0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave function which satisﬁes the boundary conditions p(0) = 0,
p(¯ θ)=1 . Similarly, a vacancy ﬁnds a worker with probability q(θ(x)),w h e r eq : R+ →
[0,1] is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing function such that q(θ)=
θ
−1p(θ), q(0) = 1,a n dlimθ→∞ q(θ)=0 . The properties of the functions p and q are
meant to capture the realistic feature that, the tighter is the submarket, the higher is the
probability that a worker ﬁnds a vacancy and the lower is the probability that a vacancy
ﬁnds a worker.
When a worker meets a ﬁrm in submarket x,h ei so ﬀered an employment contract
which gives him the lifetime expected utility x if he accepts it. If the worker rejects
the ﬁrm’s oﬀer (an event that does not occur along the equilibrium path), he returns
to his previous employment position. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, he ﬁr s tm u s tl e a v e
his previous employment position to enter his new employment relationship with the
ﬁrm. Then, the worker and the ﬁrm draw the the idiosyncratic productivity ˜ z ∈ Z
of their match, where ˜ z is a random variable with a density function f : Z → [0,1].
The idiosyncratic component of productivity is constant throughout the duration of the
match.
During the last stage, an unemployed worker produces and consumes b units of output.
A worker employed at a job z produces y + z units of output and consumes w of them,
where w is speciﬁed by the worker’s labor contract. At the end of the last stage, nature
draws next period’s aggregate productivity ˆ y from the probability distribution φ(ˆ y|y),
φ : Y × Y → [0,1]. Throughout this paper, the caret indicates variables or functions in
the next period.
6That is, workers and ﬁrms treat the tightness θ(x) just like households and ﬁrms treat prices in a
Walrasian Equilibrium.
92.2 Contractual Environment
The literature has considered a variety of assumptions about the contractual environment
in models of search on the job. For example, Burdett and Coles (2003), Stevens (2004)
and Shi (2006) assume that a labor contract is a wage/tenure proﬁle. Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), Delacroix and Shi (2006) and Shimer (2006) assume that a contract is
a wage that remains constant throughout the employment relationship. Barlevy (2002)
and Nagypál (2007) assume that a contract can only prescribe the current wage and is
renegotiated in every period. In this paper, we depart from the existing literature, and
assume that employment contracts are complete. That is, the contracts prescribe the
wage, the separation strategy, and the worker’s on-the-job search strategy as a function of
the entire history of the match. While the assumption of complete contracts is strong, it is
a useful a benchmark that should be studied before considering alternative assumptions.7
To specify the contracts, let the history of a match be a vector {z;yt} ∈ Z×Y t,w h e r e
z is the match-speciﬁc component of productivity and yt = {y1,y 2,...yt} is the sequence of
realizations of the aggregate component of productivity since the inception of the match.8
An employment contract a ∈ ANz is an allocation {wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0.T h e ﬁrst element of
a denotes the wage as a function of the worker’s tenure t and the history of the match
{z;yt},w h e r ewt : Z × Y t → R. The second element denotes the separation probability
as a function of the tenure t and the history {z,yt+1},w h e r eτt : Z × Y t+1 → [δ,1].
The last element denotes the submarket where the worker searches while on the job as a
function of the tenure t and the history {z,yt+1},w h e r ent : Z × Y t+1 → R.
In the remainder of the paper, we let a(z;yt) ∈ A denote the allocation prescribed
b yt h ee m p l o y m e n tc o n t r a c ta after the history {z;yt} is realized. Note that a(z;yt) is
equal to {wt(z;yt),τt(z;yt, ˆ y),n t(z;yt, ˆ y)} ∪ a(z;yt, ˆ y).
7Moen and Rosen (2006) assume that, when a worker and a ﬁrm match, they maximize the joint
suplus of the match. In Section 3, we prove that the assumption of complete contracts generates the
same allocation as the assumption of joint surplus maximization.
8In general, a complete contract should specify w, τ,a n dn as functions of the match-speciﬁcc o m -
ponent of productivity z and the sequence of realizations of the aggregate state of the economy since
the inception of the match, ψ
t = {ψ1,ψ2,...ψt}. However, in this paper, we are interested in equilib-
ria in which the tightness function θ(x) depends on the aggregate state of the economy ψ =( y,u,g)
only through y and not through the entire distribution of workers across employment states. In these
equilibria, the history {z;yt} provides enough contingencies for a contract to be eﬃcient.
103 Conditions and Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
In this paper, we are interested in block recursive equilibria in which the agents’ values,
optimal decisions, and the market tightness depend on the aggregate state of the econ-
omy ψ =( y,u,g) only through y and not through the multi-dimensional distribution
of workers across employment states. In such equilibria, we can write the tightness in
submarket x as θ(x;y), instead of θ(x;ψ), when the aggregate component of productivity
is y. Moreover, we can denote U(y) as the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker when
the aggregate component of productivity is y. Similarly, W(z;y|a) denotes the lifetime
utility of a worker who is employed at a job with idiosyncratic productivity z and whose
contract prescribes the allocation a. J(z;y|a) denotes the lifetime proﬁts of the ﬁrm that
employs him. The lifetime utilities U, W, and J are measured at the beginning of the
production stage.
3.1 Worker’s Value of Searching
Consider a worker who has received the opportunity to look for a job at the beginning of
the search stage. If the worker visits submarket x, he succeeds in ﬁnding a job with prob-
ability p(θ(x;y)), and he fails with probability 1−p(θ(x;y)). If he succeeds, he enters the
production stage in a new employment relationship which gives him the lifetime expected
utility x. If he fails, he enters the production stage in the same employment position that
he previously held, which gives him the lifetime expected utility υ. Therefore, conditional
on visiting submarket x, the worker’s lifetime expected utility at the beginning of the
search stage is υ+p(θ(x;y))(x − υ). Conditional on choosing x optimally9,t h ew o r k e r ’ s
lifetime expected utility is υ + D(υ;y),w h e r e
D(υ;y)=m a x x p(θ(x;y))(x − υ). (R1)
Denote m(υ;y) as the solution for x to the maximization problem in (R1).
9This qualiﬁcation is relevant. When the worker is unemployed, he chooses x to maximize his lifetime
utility. However, when the worker is employed, he chooses x according to the prescriptions of his labor
contract, rather than to maximize his lifetime utility.
113.2 Worker’s Value of Unemployment
Consider an unemployed worker at the beginning of the production stage. In the current
period, the worker produces and consumes b units of output. In the next period, the
worker enters the search stage without a job and has the opportunity to look for one
with probability λu. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility U(y) is equal to
U(y)=b + βE[U(ˆ y)+λuD(U(ˆ y); ˆ y)].( R 2 )
Throughout this paper, E denotes the conditional expectation on ˆ y, calculated with the
distribution φ(ˆ y|y).
3.3 Joint Value of a Match
Consider a matched pair of a ﬁrm and a worker at the beginning of the production
stage. The history of their match is {z,yt}.L e ta = {w,τ,n} ∪ ˆ a denote the allocation
prescribed by their employment contract after the history {z;yt} has realized.
In the current period, the worker consumes w units of output. During the next
separation stage, the worker loses his job with probability τ, and keeps it with probability
1−τ.I nt h eﬁrst case, the worker enters the search stage unemployed and does not have
the opportunity to look for a new job. In the second case, the worker enters the search
stage employed and, with probability λe, he has the opportunity to look for an alternative
job in submarket n. Therefore, the worker’s lifetime utility W(z;y|a) is equal to
W(z;y|a)= w + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))[n(ˆ y) − W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))]}.
(R3)
In the current period, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sy+z−w. During the next separation stage,
the ﬁrm loses the worker with probability τ. During the next matching stage, the ﬁrm
loses the worker with probability (1 − τ)λep(θ(n)). The probability that the ﬁrm keeps
t h ew o r k e ru n t i lt h en e x tp r o d u c t i o ns t a g ei s(1−τ)( 1−λep(θ(n))). Therefore, the ﬁrm’s
lifetime proﬁts J(z;y|a) are equal to
J(z;y|a)=y + z − w + βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))]J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))}. (R4)
12Now, consider the hypothetical problem of choosing the allocation a in order to max-
imize the sum of the worker’s lifetime utility and the ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts from the
match. As we prove in the appendix, the maximized joint value of the match V (z;y) is
V (z;y)= m a x
w,τ,n y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]V (z;ˆ y)}+
+βλeE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)]p(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))[n(ˆ y) − V (z;ˆ y)]},
w ∈ R,τ : Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R.
(R5)





t=0 that maximizes the joint value of the match. At the sepa-
ration stage, a∗(z;y) speciﬁes that the worker and the ﬁrm should voluntarily break up
if and only if the sum of their values is greater when they are apart than when they are
together. That is, τ∗
t−1(yt)=1iﬀ U(yt) is greater than V (z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt),y t), and
τ∗
t(yt)=δ otherwise. At the search stage, the allocation speciﬁes that the worker should
visit the submarket that maximizes the product between the probability of ﬁnding a job
and the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value from ﬁnding a job, i.e. n∗
t−1(yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt).
Finally, since the wage is just a transfer from the ﬁrm to the worker and both parties are
risk neutral, the allocation may specify any {w∗
t}∞
t=0. Therefore, the allocation a∗(z;y)
may attain any division of the joint value of the match V (z;y) between the ﬁrm and the
worker.
3.4 Firm’s Value of a Meeting
When a ﬁrm meets a worker in submarket x, it chooses an employment contract that
maximizes its expected proﬁts subject to providing the worker with the lifetime utility








What is the solution to (R6)? First, consider a generic contract a. Conditional on any
realization z of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts J(z;y|a(z))
cannot be greater than the diﬀerence between the maximized joint value of the match,
V (z;y), and the worker’s lifetime utility, W(z;y|a(z)). Therefore, if the contract a pro-
vides the worker with the expected lifetime utility x,t h eﬁrm’s expected proﬁts cannot
13be greater than
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi)−x. Next, consider the contract a∗ = {a∗(zi;y)}i.C o n -
ditional on any realization z of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts J(z;y|a∗(z;y)) are equal to the diﬀerence between the maximized joint value of
the match, V (z;y), and the worker’s lifetime utility, W(z;y|a∗(z;y)). Therefore, for the
appropriate selection of wages, the contract a∗ provides the worker with the expected
lifetime utility x and the ﬁrm with the expected proﬁts
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.T h e s e
observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Contract) (i) The ﬁrm’s value from meeting a worker in sub-
market x is
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x. (ii) Any employment contract that solves the ﬁrm’s
p r o b l e m( R 6 )p r e s c r i b e st h ea l l o c a t i o n :( a )nt−1(z;yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt), for all {z;yt} ∈
Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...;( b )τt−1(z;yt)=d(z;yt), for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...,w h e r e
d(z;y)=1iﬀ U(y) >V(z;y)+λeD(V (z;y);y) and d∗(z;y)=δ otherwise.
Proof. In Appendix B. ¥
In the remainder of the paper, we are going to describe the prescriptions of the optimal




During the search stage, a ﬁrm chooses how many vacancies to create and where to
locate them. The ﬁrm’s beneﬁt of creating a vacancy in submarket x is the product
between the probability of meeting a worker, q(θ(x;y)), and the value of meeting a
worker,
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.T h eﬁrm’s cost of creating a vacancy in submarket x is k.
When the beneﬁt is strictly smaller than the cost, the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is to create
no vacancies in x. When the beneﬁt is strictly greater than the cost, the ﬁrm’s optimal
policy is to create inﬁnitely many vacancies in x. And when the beneﬁta n dt h ec o s t
are equal, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are independent from the number of vacancies it creates in
submarket x.
In any submarket that is visited by a positive number of workers, the tightness θ(x;y)
14is consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and only if
q(θ(x;y))[
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x] ≤ k, (R7)
and θ(x;y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. In any submarket that workers do not
visit, the tightness θ(x;y) is consistent with the ﬁrm’s optimal creation strategy if and
only if q(θ(x;y))·[
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi)−x] is smaller or equal than k. Following most of the
literature on directed search (e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, Shi 2006, Menzio 2007),
we restrict attention to equilibria in which the tightness θ(x;y) satisﬁes condition (R7)
in all submarkets.10
3.6 Laws of Motion
From the optimal policy functions, we can compute the probability that a worker transits
from one employment state to the other. First, consider a worker who is unemployed at
the beginning of the period. Let θu(y) denote θ(m(U(y);y);y). Then, at the end of the
period, the worker is still unemployed with probability 1−λup(θu(y)), and he is employed
at job of type ˆ z with probability λup(θu(y))f(ˆ z). Next, consider a worker who is employed
at a job of type z at the beginning of the period. Let θz(z;y) denote θ(m(V (z;y);y);y).
Then, at the end of the period, the worker is unemployed with probability d(z;y).H ei s
employed at a job of type ˆ z 6= z with probability [1−d(z;y)] λep(θz(z;y))f(ˆ z),a n da ta
job of type z with probability [1 − d(z;y)] {1 − λep(θz(z;y))[1 − f(z)]}.
From these transition probabilities, we can compute the laws of motion for the mea-
sure of unemployed workers and for the measure of workers employed at each idiosyncratic
productivity z. In particular, the measure of workers who are unemployed at the end of
the period is:
ˆ u = u(1 − λup(θu(y))) +
P
i d(zi;y)g(zi).( R 8 )
Similarly, the measure of workers who, at the end of the period, are employed at a job
10This restriction is made without loss in generality. To see why, consider an equilibrium in which
submarket x0 is not visited by any workers and its tightness θ(x0) is such that θ(x0) > 0 and
q(θ(x0))[
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi)−x0] <k . Then, modify the equilibrium by replacing θ(x0) with ˜ θ(x0),w h e r e
˜ θ(x0) is the tightness of submarket x0 that satisﬁes condition (R7). In this modiﬁed equilibrium, the
workers’ search strategy is unchanged because ˜ θ(x0) is smaller than θ(x0).I nt h i sm o d i ﬁed equilibrium,
the ﬁrms’ creation startegy is unchanged because q(˜ θ(x0))[
P
i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x0] is smaller than k.
15with idiosyncratic productivity z is:
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+( 1− d(z;y))(1 − λep(θz(z;y)))g(z). (R9)
The function h(ψ) denotes the measure of workers who are hired during the matching




3.7 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
T h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h sm o t i v a t et h ef o l l o w i n gd e ﬁnition of equilibrium.
Definition 1: A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness
function θ
∗ : R×Y → R+; a search value function D∗ : R×Y → R, and policy function
m∗ : R × Y → R; an unemployment value function U∗ : Y → R; a match value function
V ∗ : Z × Y → R; a separation function d∗ : Z × Y → R; and the laws of motion
ˆ u∗ : Ψ → [0,1],a n dˆ g∗ : Z × Ψ → [0,1] for unemployment and employment. These
functions satisfy the following requirements:
(i) For all x ∈ R and all ψ ∈ Ψ, θ
∗ satisﬁes the functional equation (R7);
(ii) For all V ∈ R and all ψ ∈ Ψ, D∗ satisﬁes the functional equation (R1), and m∗ is
the associated optimal policy function;
(iii) For all ψ ∈ Ψ, U∗ satisﬁes the functional equation (R2);
(iv) For all z ∈ Z and all ψ ∈ Ψ, V ∗ satisﬁes the functional equation (R6), and d∗ is
the associated optimal policy function;
(v) For all ψ ∈ Ψ, ˆ u∗ and ˆ g∗ satisfy the equations (R8) and (R9).
4E x i s t e n c e a n d E ﬃciency of Equilibrium
In this section, we prove existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of a Block Recursive Equi-
librium. To this aim, we ﬁrst formulate the problem of the social planner and characterize
16its solution. Next, we prove that, if a Block Recursive Equilibrium exists, then it gen-
erates the same allocation that solves the planner’s problem. Moreover, we prove that a
BRE can always be built from the solution to the planner’s problem. We conclude the
section by providing a qualitative characterization of the equilibrium in and out of steady
state.
4.1 Social Planner’s Problem
At the beginning of the period, the social planner observes the state of the economy
ψ = {y,u,g}. At the separation stage, he chooses the destruction probability d(z) for
matches with idiosyncratic productivity z, d : Z → [δ,1]. At the search stage, he chooses
the tightness θu for the submarket where he sends unemployed workers to look for jobs,
θu ∈ R+, and the tightness θz(z) for the submarket where he sends workers employed on
jobs of type z to look for better jobs, θz : Z → R+. The choices of d, θu and θz determine
the distribution of workers across employment states at the production stage and, hence,
at the beginning of next period. The social planner’s objective is to maximize the sum of
current and future aggregate consumption discounted at the rate β. Denote the planner’s
value function as s0(ψ). The planner’s problem is
s0(ψ)=m a x d,θu,θz F(d,θu,θ z|ψ)+βEs0(ˆ ψ)
s.t. ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)] +
P
i d(zi)g(zi),
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+[ 1− d(z)][1 − λep(θz(z))]g(z),
h(ψ)=λup(θu)u + λe
P
i [1 − d(zi)]p(θz(zi))g(zi),
(P1)
where F is the current period’s aggregate consumption given by
F(d,θu,θ z|ψ)=ˆ ub +
P
i(y + zi)ˆ g(zi) − k[λuuθu + λe
P
i(1 − d(zi))g(zi)θz(zi)].
The planner’s value function s0(ψ) is linear in both the measure u of workers who are
unemployed and the measure g(z) o fw o r k e r sw h oa r ee m p l o y e da tj o b sw i t hi d i o s y n c r a t i c








z(zi;y)g(zi).( P 2 )
The coeﬃcient s0
u(y) can be interpreted as the diﬀerence between the present value of
17output produced by a worker who is currently unemployed and the present value of
output invested in creating vacancies for him. Similarly, the coeﬃcient s0
z(z;y) can be
interpreted as the present value of net output produced by a worker who is currently
employed at a job of type z. In line with basic economic intuition, the coeﬃcient s0
z(z;y)
is increasing in z. These properties of the planner’s value function are established in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Social Planner’s Problem) (i) The value of the plan s0 : Ψ → R is the
unique solution to the functional equation (P1). (ii) There exist functions s0
u : Y → R
and s0




z(zi;y)g(zi). (iii) The function s0
z(zi;y) is non-decreasing in z.
Proof. In Appendix C. ¥
The planner’s assignment of vacancies to the submarket with unemployed workers is
optimal only if
k ≥ p




z(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − s
0
u(ˆ y)]} (P3)
and θu ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. This condition is easy to understand. The
left hand side of (P3) is the cost of assigning an extra vacancy to the submarket with
unemployed workers. The right hand side of (P3) is the expected beneﬁtf r o ms u c ha n
extra vacancy, given by the product of two terms. The ﬁrst term, p0(θu),i st h en u m b e r
of unemployed workers who ﬁnd a job because of the extra vacancy. The second term is
the diﬀerence between the present value of net output produced by an employed and an
unemployed worker, measured at the production stage. Notice that, since the left hand
side is independent from θu and the right hand side is strictly decreasing, the optimality
condition (P3) admits a unique solution in each aggregate state ψ.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e( P 3 )
depends on the aggregate state of the economy only through y, the optimal policy is a
function θ
0
u : Y → R+.
The planner’s assignment of vacancies to the submarket with workers who are em-






z(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − s
0
z(z;ˆ y)]} (P4)
18and θz(z), with complementary slackness. The interpretation of the optimality condition
(P4) is similar to that of (P3), except that the extra vacancy is assigned to a submarket
populated by workers who are employed at jobs with idiosyncratic productivity z rather
than unemployed. As it is the case for (P3), the optimality condition (P4) admits a
unique solution for θz(z) in each aggregate state ψ. Moreover, since (P4) depends on
the aggregate state of the economy ψ only through y, the optimal policy is a function
θ
0
z : Z × Y → R+.
The planner’s choice of the destruction probability for matches with idiosyncratic
productivity z is optimal if and only if d(z)=1whenever
b + βEs0

















and d(z)=δ otherwise. The interpretation of this condition is straightforward. The
left hand side of (P5) is the present value of net output produced by a worker who is
unemployed at the beginning of the production stage. The right hand side of (P5) is
the present value of net output produced by a worker who is employed at a job with
idiosyncratic productivity z at the beginning of the search stage. Clearly, the optimality
condition (P5) admits only one solution for d(z) in each aggregate state ψ.M o r e o v e r ,
since (P5) depends on the aggregate state of the economy ψ only y, the optimal policy
is a function d0 : Z × Y → [δ,1].
Finally, the derivative of the social planner’s value function with respect to the mea-



















Similarly, the derivative of the social planner’s value function with respect to the measure
of workers employed at jobs of type z is:
s0
z(z;y)= d0(z;y)[b + βEs0



















Denote with {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗} a Block Recursive Equilibrium. The market tight-
ness function θ
∗(x;y) is derived from the equilibrium condition (R7). In particular, let
˜ x(y) denote the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match and
the cost of a vacancy, i.e. ˜ x(y) ≡
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − k. In all of the submarkets where
workers are oﬀered less than ˜ x(y), the equilibrium tightness is strictly positive and such
that the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from opening a vacancy is equal to the cost. As the lifetime utility
oﬀered to the workers approaches ˜ x(y), the equilibrium tightness converges towards zero.
In all of the submarkets where workers are oﬀered more than ˜ x(y), θ
∗(x;y) is equal to






i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − x)) if x ≤ ˜ x(y),
0i f x>˜ x(y). (E1)
The search policy function m∗(υ;y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (R1). That is,
m∗(υ;y) maximizes the product between the worker’s probability of ﬁnding a job, i.e.
p(θ
∗(x;y)), and the worker’s value of taking the job and leaving his previous employment
position, i.e. x − υ. Equation (E1) implies that the worker’s probability of ﬁn d i n gaj o b
is zero in all submarkets x>˜ x(y). Equation (E1) also implies that, in all submarkets
x ≤ ˜ x(y), the worker’s value of a job is equal to the diﬀerence between the worker’s
and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match and the ﬁrm’s expected cost of creating a match, i.e.
x =
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − k/q(θ








∗(zi;y)f(zi) − υ]}. (E2)
In equilibrium, whenever an unemployed worker has the opportunity to search, he
visits submarket m∗(U∗(y);y).L e t θ
∗
u(y) denote the tightness of this submarket. In
equilibrium, whenever a worker employed at a job with idiosyncratic productivity z has
the opportunity to search, he visits submarket m∗(V ∗(z;y);y).L e t θ
∗
z(z;y) denote the














u(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Similarly, from equation (E2), it follows
that the tightness θ










z(z;y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness.
In equilibrium, the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker is U∗(y) at the beginning
of the production stage. Let s∗
u(y) denote the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker
at the beginning of the separation stage, i.e. s∗
u(y)=U∗(y)+λuD(U∗(y);y). In equilib-
rium, the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match is V ∗(z;y) at the beginning of the
production stage. Let s∗
z(z;y) denote the worker’s and ﬁrm’s joint value of a match at the
beginning of the separation stage, i.e. s∗
z(z;y) equals the sum between d∗(z;y) · U∗(z;y)
















And the equilibrium condition (R5) implies that
s∗
z(z;y)= d∗(z;y)[b + βEs∗
u(ˆ y)] − [1 − d∗(z;y)]kλeθ
∗
z(z;y)+
+[1− d∗(z;y)][1 − λep(θ
∗









where d∗(z;y) is equal to 1 if
b + βEs∗




























z}. This system of equations admits only one solution. Therefore,
any Block Recursive Equilibrium is eﬃcient. Moreover, the equations (E3)—(E7) are not
only necessary for a Block Recursive Equilibrium, but they are also suﬃcient. There-
fore, an equilibrium can always be constructed from the solution to the social planner’s
21problem. We summarize these ﬁndings as the paper’s main theoretical result.
Theorem 3 (Existence, Uniqueness and Eﬃciency) (i) A Block Recursive Equilibrium
exists. (ii) Let {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ




∗(m∗(U∗(y);y);y),a n dl e tθ
∗
z(z;y) denote θ










Proof: In the Appendix D. ¥
The eﬃciency of the equilibrium is an intuitive result. Complete contracts guarantee
that, whenever an employed worker has to make a choice, he takes into account the
eﬀect of his decision on the proﬁts of his current employer. Moreover, directed search
guarantees that the worker’s value in submarket x is equal to the joint value of a match
to the worker and his prospective employer net of the cost of creating a match in a
submarket with tightness θ(x;y).
A surprising result is the existence of an equilibrium in which the agents’ value and
policy functions and the market tightness function do not depend on the distribution
of workers across employment states. Given the equivalence between the equilibrium
allocation and the plan, we can provide some intuition for this result by looking at the
social planner’s problem.
For example, consider the planner’s choice of θu. The cost of assigning θuu vacancies
to the submarket visited by unemployed workers is kθu per worker. This cost does not
depend on the distribution of workers across employment states because the technology
for creating vacancies is linear. For each unemployed worker, the probability of becom-
ing employed is p(θu). This probability does not depend on the number of workers who
are unemployed because the matching process between vacancies and applicants features
constant returns to scale. This probability does not depend on the number of workers
who are in other employment states, because diﬀerent workers visit diﬀerent submar-
kets. Finally, the additional output produced by each unemployed worker who becomes
employed is independent from the workers’ distribution because the production technol-
ogy is linear in labor (both at home and in the market). Since the planner’s objective
function is independent from the distribution of workers across employment states, so
22are the optimal policy function θ
0
u(y) and the value function s0
u(y). The reader should
notice that, for the previous argument to hold, it is critical that diﬀerent workers search
in diﬀerent submarkets. That is, it is critical that search is directed.
4.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
Now, we are in the position to characterize the equilibrium of our model economy.
Equation (E3) implies that the tightness of the submarket visited by an unemployed
worker is an increasing function of the diﬀerence between the value of a new match, i.e.
P
V ∗(zi;y)f(zi), and the value of unemployment, i.e. U∗(y). Equation (E4) implies that
the tightness of the submarket visited by an employed worker is an increasing function
of the diﬀerence between the value of a new match and the value of his current match.
Since the value of a match is increasing in the idiosyncratic component of its productivity,
θ
∗
z(z;y) is a decreasing function of z.
Equation (E7) characterizes the workers’ transitions from employment to unemploy-
ment. In particular, an employed worker becomes unemployed with probability 1 if the
value of his match at the beginning of the separation stage is smaller than the value of
unemployment. Otherwise, he becomes unemployed with probability δ.S i n c et h ev a l u e
of a match is strictly increasing in the idiosyncratic component of productivity, there
exists a zeu(y) such that d∗(z;y)=1for all z<z eu(y) and d∗(z;y)=δ for all.z ≥ zeu(y).





z} and y, we can easily compute it. For the parameter values in Table 2, the
diﬀerence between the value of a match and the value of unemployment is increasing
in the aggregate component of productivity. On the one hand, this implies that the
tightness of the submarket visited by unemployed workers is an increasing function of y.
On the other hand, this implies that the probability that a worker employed at a job of
type z is a decreasing function of y.
For the parameter values in Table 2, the diﬀerence between the value of a new match
and the value of a match with a relatively low idiosyncratic productivity is increasing in y.
The diﬀerence between the value of a new match and a relatively high productivity match
is decreasing in y. Therefore, the eﬀect that a positive shock to aggregate productivity
23has on the tightness of the submarket visited by an employed worker depends on the
quality of his job.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
We begin this section by describing the dataset that we are going to use to calibrate
our model. This dataset includes all the information used by Shimer (2005) to calibrate
the textbook search model of Pissarides (1985). However, since our model has more
parameters than Pissarides’, the dataset contains additional information about the job-
to-job transition rate and the tenure distribution. In the second part of the section, we
describe and motivate the calibration strategy. In particular, we explain why we can
recover the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities from the tenure distribution. In
the last part of the section, we report the results of the calibration.
5.1 Data
We measure quarterly productivity as the CPS output per worker in the non-farm busi-
ness sector, and unemployment as a 3-month average of the CPS monthly rate of un-
employment in the civilian population. We construct the cyclical component of these
two variables as the diﬀerence between the log of the raw data and an HP trend (with
the usual smoothing parameter 1600). Over the period between 1951(I) and 2006(II),
the average of our measure of productivity is 82 (100 being productivity in 1992) and
the average of our measure of unemployment is 5.6 percent. Over the same period, the
cyclical components of productivity and unemployment move together. However, cycli-
cal unemployment is more than 10 times as volatile as productivity. These and other
statistics are reported in Table 1.
We measure the rate at which employed workers become unemployed (the EU rate)
as well as the rate at which unemployed workers become employed (the UE rate) using
the methodology developed by Shimer (2005). Speciﬁcally, we measure the EU rate in
month t as heu
t = us
t+1/(1 − ut),w h e r eus
t+1 is the CPS short-term unemployment rate
in month t +1 ,a n dut is the CPS unemployment rate.11 We measure the UE rate in
11The CPS deﬁnes the short-term unemployment rate as the ratio between the number of civilians
24month t as hue
t =1− (ut+1 − us
t+1)/ut. Then, we construct the quarterly transition
rates by taking 3-month averages of heu
t and hue
t . Over the period between 1951(I) and
2006(II), the average EU rate is 2.6 percent, and the average UE rate is 45 percent. Over
this period, the cyclical component of the EU rate is positively correlated with cyclical
unemployment and it is approximately 60 percent as volatile. The cyclical component
of the UE rate is negatively correlated with unemployment and it is approximately 65
percent as volatile.
T h er a t ea tw h i c hw o r k e r sm o v ef r o me m p l o y e rt oe m p l o y e ri sm e a s u r e db yN a g y p á l
(2008) from the CPS microdata. Speciﬁcally, she measures the EE rate in month t as
hee
t = fee
t /et,w h e r efee
t is the number of workers who are employed at diﬀerent ﬁrms in
months t and t+1,a n det is the number of workers who are employed in month t.O v e r
the period between 1994(I) and 2006(II), the average EE rate is 2.9 percent. Over the
same period, the cyclical component of the EE rate is negatively correlated with cyclical
unemployment and it is approximately 30 percent as volatile. Prior to 1994, Nagypál’s
measure of the EE rate cannot be constructed because the CPS did not collect data on
job-to-job transitions.
We measure vacancies with the Conference Board Help-Wanted Index. Over the
period 1951(I)-2006(II), the contemporaneous correlation between cyclical vacancies and
cyclical unemployment is -.92. Over the same period, the standard deviation of cyclical
v a c a n c i e si s1 0p e r c e n th i g h e rt h a nt h es t a n dard deviation of cyclical unemployment.
Finally, in order to calibrate the probability distribution of the match-speciﬁcc o m p o -
nent of productivity, we use information about the duration of employment relationships
in the US labor market. In particular, we use the measure of the distribution of workers
across tenure lengths that Diebold, Neumark and Polsky (1997) have constructed from
the 1987 CPS tenure supplement. This tenure distribution is plotted in Figure 1.
who have been unemployed for 0 to 4 weeks and the civilian labor force. However, with the 1994 redesign
of the CPS, there has been a change in the measurement of the duration of unemployment. As discussed
in Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2007), the change in the measurement can be corrected by multiplying
the oﬃcial short-term unemployment by 1.15 in each month from February 1994 on.
255.2 Calibration Strategy
With the data described in the previous paragraphs, we need to calibrate the household’s
preferences {b,β}, the search technology {λu,λ e,p,δ}, and the production technology
{k,Z,f,Y,φ}. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict attention to job-ﬁnding probability
functions of the form p(θ)=m i n {1,θ
γ}, γ ∈ (0,1). We also restrict the distribution
of the idiosyncratic component of productivity to be a 1,000 point approximation of a
Weibull distribution with mean μz, scale σz,a n ds h a p eαz.12 The aggregate component
of productivity obeys a 3-state Markov process with unconditional mean μy, standard
deviation σy, and autocorrelation ρy. Without loss of generality, we normalize μy to 1
and μz to 0.
We choose one month as the length of a model period. We set β so that the annual
interest rate in the model is 5 percent. We set the vacancy cost k, the scale parameter
in the distribution function of the idiosyncratic component of productivity σz,a n dt h e
search probability λe so that the average UE, EU and EE rates are the same in the model
as in the data (see Table 1). We set the search probability λu to 1 because it is diﬃcult
to identify it separately from k and λe.
Our strategy for calibrating the remaining parameters is less standard and deserves
some discussion. In the model, the parameter γ determines the elasticity of the UE
rate with respect to the tightness of the submarket visited by unemployed workers, θu.
Moreover, since a disproportionate number of vacancies are created in this submarket,
the parameter γ is positively correlated with the elasticity of the UE rate with respect to
the ratio between total vacancies and unemployment. Therefore, even without data on
θu, we are able to identify γ from the coeﬃcient of log(v/u) in the regression of loghue.
In the model, the shape parameter in the density function of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity, αz, and the exogenous separation rate, δ,a ﬀect the shape of the hazard/tenure


























where Γ is the gamma function.With this distribution, we will be able to use αz in matching the tenure
distribution and σz in matching the EU rate. In contrast, if f (z) is the normal or the lognormal
distribution, one parameter (i.e., the standard deviation) is forced to serve both roles in the calibration.
26proﬁle, i.e., the probability that a worker leaves his job as a function of tenure. A higher
αz reduces the skewness of the probability distribution of the match-speciﬁc component of
productivity. In turn, this tends to reduce the hazard rate at short tenures (1 to 2 years)
and to increase it at medium tenures (2 to 4 years). In contrast, a higher δ increases the
hazard rate at all tenures, including long ones (more than 4 years). Therefore, we are
able to identify both αz and δ by minimizing the distance between the tenure distribution
generated by the model and its empirical counterpart.13
In the model, the ratio between the productivity of labor at home and in the market
is b/(y +
P
i zig(zi)). In the US economy, Hall and Milgrom (2008) estimate the ratio
between labor productivity at home and in the market to be 71 percent. Therefore, we
can identify the parameter b by equating the productivity ratio in the model and in the
data14. Finally, we choose σy and ρy so that the average productivity of labor has the
same standard deviation and autocorrelation in the model and in the data.
5.3 Calibration Outcomes
Column a in Table 2 contains the results of our calibration. Most notably, we ﬁnd that
employed workers have the opportunity of searching the labor market nearly as often as
unemployed workers (λe =0 .83, λu =1 ) . Yet, the rate at which employed workers move
from one employer to the other is 20 times smaller than the rate at which unemployed
workers become employed because the latter seek jobs that oﬀer less generous terms of
trade and are easier to ﬁnd.
We also ﬁnd that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the productivity of a new
match. At the ninetieth percentile of the probability distribution f(z), the productivity
of a match is twice as large as at the tenth percentile. However, because the survival
probability of a match is endogenous, not all of this uncertainty translates into dispersion
in the cross-sectional productivity distribution g(z). At the ninetieth percentile of g(z),
13Moscarini (2003) uses the same strategy and the same data to calibrate an on-the-job search model
in which workers and ﬁrms receive noisy signals about the unobservable quality of their match.
14Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) set b so that the average cost of recruiting a worker is the same
in the model and in the data. Given this calibration target, Hagedorn and Manovskii ﬁnd that the
relative productivity of labor at home and in the market is approximately 90 percent. If we were to
set the productivity ratio to 0.90 rather than 0.71, our model would predict an even larger response of
unemplyoment and vacancies to a given shock to the aggregate component of productivity.
27the productivity of a match is only 1.3 times as large as at the tenth percentile. This
process of endogenous selection also creates a large wedge between the expected produc-
tivity of a new match and the average of the cross-sectional productivity distribution. In
particular, the expected productivity of a new match, μy +
P
zif(zi), is equal to 1, while
the cross-sectional average productivity of a match, apl =( 1− u)−1 P
(μy + zi)g(zi),i s
1.37.
6 Business Cycle Analysis
In this section, we use the calibrated model to measure the contribution of aggregate
productivity shocks (henceforth, y-shocks) to the cyclical volatility of US unemployment,
vacancies and other labor market variables. Then, we compare these measurements with
those that an economist would obtain if he were to use a version of the model in which
the EU and EE rates are exogenous. From this comparison, it will be clear that, in order
to properly measure the contribution of shocks to the cyclical volatility of the US labor
market, an economist needs a model in which not only the UE, but also the EU and EE
rates are endogenous. These two measurement exercises are carried out in the second
and third part of the section. In the ﬁrst part of the section, as a preliminary step, we
use the calibrated model to measure the response of the US labor market to a 1 percent
increase in the aggregate component of productivity.
6.1 Response to a Productivity Shock
I no r d e rt os t u d yt h er e s p o n s eo ft h el a b o rm a r k e tt oa1p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nt h ea g g r e g a t e
component of productivity, we ﬁrst compute the Block Recursive Equilibrium of our
calibrated model. Then, we feed into the model the sequence of realizations of aggregate
component of productivity {yt},w h e r eyt = μy for all t ≤ 9,000 and yt =1 .01·μy for all
t>9,000. Finally, we calculate the percentage change in unemployment, vacancies and
other labor market variables in response to the increase in the aggregate component of
productivity.
The ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match increases when the aggregate productiv-
ity shock hits the economy. In response to the increase in the value of a match, ﬁrms open
28more vacancies per applicant in every submarket x. In response to the increase in the
labor market tightness, unemployed workers choose to visit submarkets in which vacan-
cies oﬀer more generous terms of trade and the probability of trade is higher. Similarly,
employed workers choose, on average, to visit submarkets in which both the terms-of-
trade and the probability of trade are higher. Therefore, the UE and EE rates increase.
In contrast, the EU rate decreases because the increase in the aggregate component of
productivity induces workers and ﬁrms to keep matches that previously they would have
destroyed. Since the rate at which workers ﬂow out of unemployment decreases and the
rate at which workers ﬂow into unemployment increases, the unemployment rate un-
ambiguously falls. More precisely, a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of
productivity leads to a 2 percent increase in the UE rate, a 6 percent increase in the EE
rate, a 6 percent decrease in the EU rate, and an 8 percent decrease in the unemployment
rate (see Figure 3).
When the aggregate productvity shock hits the economy, ﬁr m so p e nm o r ev a c a n c i e s
for each unemployed worker. However, since the number of workers who are unemployed
falls so much, ﬁrms end up opening fewer vacancies for this group of workers. Similarly,
when the shock hits the economy, ﬁrms create more vacancies for each employed worker.
Since the number of employed workers increases, ﬁrms increase the number of vacancies
opened for this second group of workers. Overall, vacancies increase by approximately 3
percent (see Figure 4).
When the shock to the aggregate component of productivity hits the economy, the
distribution of employed workers across jobs with diﬀerent match-speciﬁc productivities
is subject to two opposing forces. On the one hand, the increase in aggregate productivity
induces ﬁrms and workers to keep some low productivity matches that they would have
previously destroyed. This ﬁrst force tends to worsen (in the stochastic dominance sense)
the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities. On the other hand, in response to the
shock, workers employed at low-productivity jobs search in tighter submarkets. This
second force tends to improve the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities. Figures
5 and 6 show that the ﬁrst force dominates the second one.
In Figure 5, we plot the impulse response function of the fraction of workers employed
29at jobs with idiosyncratic productivity z lower than 0.23 (i.e., the 10th percentile of the
ergodic distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities), greater than 0.23 and lower than
0.29 (i.e., the 20th percentile of the ergodic distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities),
and greater than 0.29. In Figure 5, we see that the fraction of workers employed at the
least productive class of jobs increases by more than 2 percent; the fraction of workers
employed at the intermediate class of jobs increases by 0.5 percent; and the fraction
of workers employed at the most productive jobs decreases by 0.5 percent. Overall, the
average of the distribution of match-speciﬁc productivities falls by 0.4 percent in response
to the shock. As a consequence, a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of
productivity does not increase the average productivity of labor by 1 · (μy/apl)=0 .73
percent, but only by 0.65 percent (see Figure 6).
6.2 Productivity Shocks and Business Cycles
How much of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the US labor market are driven by aggregate
productivity shocks? In order to answer this question, we compute the Block Recursive
Equilibrium of our calibrated model. Then, we draw a realization of the calibrated
stochastic process for the aggregate component of productivity y, and we compute the
quarterly time series of unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables.15
Finally, we pass the log of these series through an HP-ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter
1600.
Table 3 contains a statistical summary of our simulated data. The ﬁrst lesson that
we draw from these tables is that y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in the EU transition
rate that are negatively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in the average productivity of
labor and are approximately 8.5 times as large. In addition, y-shocks generate ﬂuctua-
tions in the UE transition rate that are positively correlated with average productivity
ﬂuctuations and are 3 times as large. As a result, unemployment moves in the opposite
direction of average productivity and it is 10.5 times more volatile.
T h es e c o n dl e s s o nt h a tw ed r a wf r o mT a b l e3i st h a ty-shocks generate ﬂuctuations
in the number of vacancies created for unemployed workers that are positively correlated
15Since the model is monthly, we measure the quarterly time series of unemployment, vacancy and
transition rates by taking 3-months averages of the monthly rates generated by the model.
30with the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and are 0.65 times as volatile. Also, y-shocks
generate ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed workers that are
negatively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and are 1.1 times as volatile.
Overall, total vacancies move in the opposite direction of unemployment and are approx-
imately 0.4 times as volatile.
By comparing Tables 1 and 3, we ﬁnd that aggregate productivity shocks account for
40 percent of the UE rate volatility that is observed in the US economy over the period
1951(I) - 2006(II); and they account for approximately all of the observed volatility of the
EU transition rate. Overall, aggregate productivity shocks alone can account for more
than 80 percent of the observed unemployment volatility. Moreover, we ﬁnd that y-shocks
account for more than 30 percent of the volatility of vacancies and for the nearly perfectly
negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies (i.e., the Beveridge curve).
Finally, we ﬁnd that y-shocks can precisely reproduce the matrix of correlations between
unemployment, vacancies and the workers’ transition rates across diﬀerent employment
states. In light of these ﬁndings, we conclude that aggregate productivity shocks may
well be the fundamental source of cyclical ﬂuctuations in the US labor market.
However, aggregate productivity shocks cannot be the only cause of the US business
cycles. First of all, y-shocks alone generate a counterfactually strong correlation between
average labor productivity and other labor market variables (e.g. unemployment, vacan-
cies, etc.). Second, y-shocks alone generate too much unemployment volatility through
ﬂuctuations in the EU rate and too little of it through ﬂuctuations in the UE rate. Finally,
y-shocks leave more than half of the observed volatility of vacancies unexplained.
6.3 Comparisons with the Canonical Search Model
At the beginning of this paper, we conjectured that, if an economist wants to properly
measure the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of
unemployment and vacancies, he should use a model in which not only the UE rate, but
also the EU and EE rates are endogenous.
In order to test this conjecture, we add the constraints σz =0and λe =0to our
model. The ﬁrst constraint states that the idiosyncratic component of productivity is the
31same for all matches and, hence, it implies that the EU transition rate is exogenous. The
s e c o n dc o n s t r a i n ts t a t e st h a te m p l o y e dw o r k e r sd on o th a v et h eo p p o r t u n i t yo fs e a r c h i n g
for better jobs and, hence, it implies that the EE transition rate is exogenous. As it turns
out, the constrained version of our model coincides with the canonical search model of
Pissarides (1985, 2000), and Shimer (2005). We then recalibrate the constrained version
of our model using the same targets that we used in Section 5.2, with the obvious exclusion
o ft h eE Et r a n s i t i o nr a t ea n dt h et e n u r ed i s t r i b u t i o n .T h er e s u l t so ft h i sc a l i b r a t i o na r e
reported as column b in Table 2. Finally, we solve for the Block Recursive Equilibrium of
the constrained model, draw a realization for the stochastic process of y, and compute the
time series for unemployment, vacancies and other labor market variables. The results
of this simulation are reported in Table 4.
According to the constrained model, y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in the unemploy-
ment rate that are negatively correlated with the ﬂuctuations in the average productivity
of labor and are 0.6 times as volatile. Also, according to the constrained model, y-shocks
generate ﬂuctuations in the vacancy rate that are positively correlated with the ﬂuctu-
ations in the average productivity of labor and are 2.5 times as volatile. By comparing
these statistics with those reported in Table 3, we conclude that, if an economist uses a
version of our model in which the EU and EE rates are exogenous (i.e., if an economist
uses the canonical search model), he is going to dramatically underestimate the frac-
tion of the cyclical volatility of unemployment and vacancies that is caused by aggregate
productivity shocks.
Next, we want to understand why the canonical search model and ours produce such
diﬀerent estimates of the contribution of aggregate productivity shocks to the cyclical
ﬂuctuations of vacancies and unemployment. First, in our model, when a positive pro-
ductivity shock hits the economy, the EU transition rate falls because workers and ﬁrms
become less selective about the idiosyncratic productivity of the matches that they are
willing to keep. In the canonical search model, when a positive productivity shock hits
the economy, the EU transition rate does not change because all matches are constrained
to be identical. For this reason, the same productivity shock tends to generate a smaller
decline in unemployment in the canonical search model than in ours (see Figures 3 and
327).
Second, in our model, a positive shock to the aggregate component of productivity
leads to a decline in the number of vacancies that are created for unemployed workers
and to an increase in the number of vacancies that are created for employed workers. In
contrast, in the canonical search model, a positive y-shock leads to an increase in the
number of vacancies that ﬁrms open for unemployed workers, because the unemployment
rate decreases much less than in our model. Moreover, in the canonical search model, a
positive y-shock does not aﬀect the number of vacancies created for employed workers
because λe =0 . Therefore, the canonical search model distorts in opposite directions
the estimates of the eﬀe c tt h a tay-shock has on the number of vacancies created for
unemployed and employed workers. As a result, the canonical search model distorts only
marginally the estimated eﬀect of a y-shock on the total vacancy rate (see Figures 4 and
8).
Third, in our model, a 1 percent increase in the aggregate component of productivity
does not increase the average productivity of labor by 1 · (μy/apl)=0 .73 percent, but
only by 0.65 percent because workers and ﬁrms become less selective about the quality of
the matches that they are willing to keep. In the canonical search model, a 1 percent in-
crease in the aggregate component of productivity translates into a 0.73 percent increase
in average productivity because all matches are identical. Since both models are cali-
brated to match the empirical volatility of the average productivity of labor, y-shocks are
approximately 12 percent smaller in the canonical model than in ours. In turn, smaller
y-shocks generate smaller ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies.
Fourth, the eﬀect of productivity shocks in the two models diﬀers because the cal-
ibrated elasticity of the job-ﬁnding probability is diﬀerent16. T h a ti s ,t h et w om o d e l s
have diﬀerent values of the parameter γ in the job-ﬁnding probability function p(θ)=
min{θ
γ,1}. In both models, the calibrated value of γ is such that the elasticity of the
UE rate with respect to the vacancy/unemployment ratio is the same in the model as
16Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) prove that, if the number of employed job-seekers is procyclical, the
coeﬃcient of log(v/u) in the regression of log(hue) provides a downward biased estimate of the elasticity
γ of the job-ﬁnding probability function with respect to vacancies. Based on this theoretical argument,
Menzio (2005) and Nagypál (2007) simulate their models of on-the-job search by using a value of γ that
is higher than the coeﬃcient of log(v/u) in the regression of log(hue). However, unlike in this paper,
neither Menzio (2005) nor Nagypál (2007) attempt to calibrate the value of γ.
33in the data, namely 0.22. Therefore, in both models, the calibrated value of γ is equal
to 0.22 · [∆log(v/u)/∆logθu],w h e r eθu is the tightness of the submarket visited by un-
employed workers. In our model, because the number of vacancies created for employed
workers moves together with θu, ∆log(v/u) is greater than ∆logθu.A s a r e s u l t , t h e
calibrated value of γ is 0.65. In the canonical model, because workers are not allowed
to search on the job, v/u is equal to θu and so γ is equal to 0.22. In turn, a smaller γ
implies that the EU rate (and, consequently, the unemployment rate) is less responsive
to a given shock to the aggregate component of productivity.
From this discussion, it is clear that, in order to properly measure the contribution
of y-shocks to the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the US labor market, an economist needs to
endogenize both the EU and the EE rate along with the UE rate. For example, if an
economist uses a version of our model in which the UE and EU rates are endogenous,
but the EE rate is exogenous (because λe is constrained to be 0), he underestimates
the elasticity of the job-ﬁnding probability with respect to the vacancy/applicant ratio.
For this reason, he underestimates the contribution of y-shocks to the volatility of the
UE rate and, consequently, of the unemployment rate. Moreover, he ignores the eﬀect
that y-shocks have on the number of vacancies created for employed workers. For this
reason, he incorrectly concludes that y-shocks generate ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and vacancies that are positively correlated17.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we have built a directed search model of the labor market in
which the workers’ transitions between employment, unemployment and across employers
are endogenous. For this model, we have proved existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency of a
recursive equilibrium with the property that the distribution of workers across diﬀerent
jobs is a state variable which does not aﬀect the agents’ value and policy functions, or the
tightness function. Because of this property, the computation of the eﬃcient equilibrium
is as simple as the computation of the equilibrium of a model without heterogeneity.
In the second paper of this paper, we have calibrated our model to match the features
17All the details about this measurement exercise are available upon request.
34of workers’ turnover in the US labor market over the period 1951(I)-2006(II). Then, we
have used the calibrated model to measure the eﬀect of aggregate productivity shocks
on the volatility of unemployment and vacancies. We have found that aggregate produc-
tivity shocks alone account for approximately 50 percent of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in
the UE transition rate and for all of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the EU transition rate.
As a result, productivity shocks alone can explain more than 80 percent of the cycli-
cal volatility of unemployment. We have found that productivity shocks generate large
countercyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for unemployed work-
ers and larger procyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed
workers. Overall, productivity shocks alone can account for 30 percent of the cyclical
volatility of vacancies, as well as for the strong negative correlation between vacancies
and unemployment.
By comparing these measurements with those derived using the canonical search
model of Pissarides (1985), we have vindicated our initial conjecture. That is, in order
to properly assess the eﬀect of productivity shocks on unemployment and vacancies,
an economist needs a model, such as ours, in which the workers’ transitions between
employment, unemployment and across employers are all endogenous.
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37AJ o i n t V a l u e o f a M a t c h
The deﬁnition of V (z;y) is
V (z;y)=m a x a∈A[W(z;y|a)+J(z;y|a)].( A 1 )
First, notice that the allocation a = {w,τ,n} ∪ ˆ a belongs to the set A if and only if
w ∈ R, τ : Y → [δ,1], n : Y → R,a n dˆ a : Y → A. Second, notice that the worker’s
lifetime utility W(z;y|a) is equal to the RHS of equation (R2) and the ﬁrm’s lifetime
proﬁts J(z;y|a) are equal to the RHS of equation (R3). In light of these observations,
we can rewrite (A1) as
V (z;y)= m a x
w,τ,n,ˆ a
y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))n(ˆ y)}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))][J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y)) + W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a(ˆ y))]},
w ∈ R,τ: Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R, ˆ a : Y → A.
(A2)
Now, notice that both the probability that the match survives during the separation
stage, i.e. 1−τ(ˆ y), and the probability that the match survives during the search stage,
i.e. 1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y)), are non negative numbers. In light of this observation, we can
rewrite (A2) as
V (z;y)= m a x
w,d,n
y + z + βE{τ(ˆ y)U(ˆ y)+[ 1− τ(ˆ y)]λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))n(ˆ y)}+
+βE{[1 − τ(ˆ y)][1 − λep(θ(n(ˆ y); ˆ y))]max
ˆ a∈A
[J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a)+W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a)]},
w ∈ R,τ: Y → [δ,1],n : Y → R.
(A3)
Finally, notice that the maximum of the sum between the worker’s continuation utility
W(z;ˆ y|ˆ a) and the ﬁrm’s continuation proﬁts J(z;ˆ y|ˆ a) is equal to V (z;ˆ y).T h e r e f o r e ,
(A3) is equal to equation (R5) in the main text. ¥
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let the contract a be a feasible choice for the ﬁrm’s problem (R6). First, notice that,
for any realization zi of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the contract a
prescribes an allocation a(zi) which may not necessarily maximize the joint value of the
match, i.e. W(zi;y|a(zi)) + J(zi;y|a(zi)) is smaller than or equal to V (zi;y). Second,
notice that, since a is feasible, it provides the worker with the lifetime utility x, i.e.
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i W(zi;y|a(zi))f(zi)=x. In light of these observations, it follows that the contract a









i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.
(A4)




t=0 that has the following properties: (a) τ∗
t−1(z;yt)=
1 iﬀ U(yt) >V(z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt);yt) and τ∗
t−1(z;yt)=δ otherwise, for all {z;yt} ∈
Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...;( b )n∗
t−1(z;yt)=m(V (z;yt);yt), for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...;
(c) w∗
t(z;yt) is such that
P
i W(zi;y|a∗(zi))f(zi)=x.F i r s t , n o t i c e t h a t , f o r a n y r e a l -
ization zi of the idiosyncratic component of productivity, the contract a∗ prescribes an
allocation a∗(zi)w h i c hm a x i m i z e st h ej o i n tv a l u eo ft h em a t c h . S e c o n d ,n o t i c et h a ta∗
provides the worker with the lifetime utility x. In light of these two observations, it









i V (zi;y)f(zi) − x.
(A5)
The contract a∗ is a feasible choice for the ﬁrm’s problem (R6), and it provides the ﬁrm
with more proﬁts than any other feasible choice. Hence, it is optimal.
Finally, the reader can easily verify that, if a contract {wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0 solves the ﬁrm’s
problem (R6), then it maximizes the joint value of the match. Hence, the contract
{wt,τt,n t}∞
t=0 prescribes that (a) τt−1(z;yt)=1iﬀ U(yt) >V(z;yt)+λeD(V (z;yt);yt)
and τt−1(z;yt)=δ otherwise, for all {z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,...;( b )nt−1(z;yt)=
m(V (z;yt);yt),f o ra l l{z;yt} ∈ Z × Y t, t =1 ,2,... ¥
C Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Let Ψ denote the set Y ×[0,1]N(z)+1.L e tC(Ψ) denote the set of bounded continuous
functions r : Ψ → R,w i t ht h es u pn o r m .D e ﬁne the operator T on C(Ψ) by




s.t. ˆ u = u[1 − λup(θu)] +
P
i d(zi)g(zi),
ˆ g(z)=h(ψ)f(z)+[ 1− d(z)][1 − λep(θz(z))]g(z),






39For each r ∈ C(Ψ) and ψ ∈ Ψ, the problem in (A6) is to maximize a continuous function
over a compact set. Hence the maximum is attained and the argmax is non-empty. Since
both F and r are bounded, Tr is also bounded; and since F and r are continuous, it
follows from the Theorem of the Maximum (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page
62) that Tr is also continuous. Hence, the operator T maps C(Ψ) into itself.
Since the operator T satisﬁes the remaining hypotheses of Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions
for a contraction (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page 54), it follows that T has a
unique ﬁxed point ˜ s ∈ C(Ψ).A n ds i n c elimt→∞ β
t˜ s(ψ)=0for all ψ ∈ Ψ, it follows that
the ﬁxed point ˜ s is equal to the value of the plan s0.
(ii) Let L(Ψ) denote the set of bounded continuous functions r : Ψ → R that are linear in
the measure u of unemployed workers as well as in the measure g(z) of workers employed




Given a function r in L(Ψ), consider the problem (A6). For each ψ ∈ Ψ, the necessary
condition for the optimality of θu is:
k ≥ p
0(θu){y − b + βE[
P
i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − ru(ˆ y)]} (A7)
and θu ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since the function p0(θ) is strictly decreasing
in θ,t h e r ei sa tm o s to n eθu that satisﬁes condition (A7). Hence the optimum is unique.
Since (A7) depends on ψ only through y, the optimal policy is a function ˜ θu : Y → [0,θ].




i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − rz(z;ˆ y)]} (A8)
and θz(z) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since p0(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ,t h e r e
is at most one θz(z) that satisﬁes condition (A8). Hence the optimum is unique. Since
(A8) depends on ψ only through y,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi saf u n c t i o n˜ θz : Z × Y → [0,θ].
For each ψ ∈ Ψ, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimality of d is d(z)=1
if





40and d(z)=δ otherwise. Since (A9) does not depend on d,t h e r ei se x a c t l yo n ed that
satisﬁes condition (A8). Since (A9) depends on ψ only through y, the optimal policy is
af u n c t i o n˜ d : Z × Y → [δ,1].
Deﬁne the function ˜ ru : Y → R by
˜ ru(y)= −kλu˜ θu(y)+
h
1 − λup(˜ θu(y))
i
[b + βEru(ˆ y)]+




And deﬁne the function ˜ rz : Z × Y → R by
˜ rz(z;y)= ˜ d(z;y)[b + βEru(ˆ y)] − [1 − ˜ d(z;y)]kλe˜ θz(z;y)+
+[1 − ˜ d(z;y)]
h
1 − λep(˜ θz(z;y))
i
[y + z + βErz(z;ˆ y)]+








Hence, the operator T maps L(Ψ) into itself. Since L(Ψ) is a closed subset of C(Ψ),i t
follows that the ﬁxed point s0 of the operator T belongs to L(Ψ) (see Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott 1989, page 52).
(iii) Let M(Ψ) denote the set of functions r : Ψ → R such that r ∈ L(Ψ) and rz :
Z × Y → R is non decreasing in z. Given a function r ∈ M(Ψ),l e t˜ r denote Tr.A sw e
proved in part (ii), the function ˜ r belongs to the set L(Ψ). Also as we proved in part (ii),
the derivative ˜ rz(z;y) is equal to (A10). Using the optimality conditions (A7)—(A9), we
can rewrite (A10) as
˜ rz (z,y)= b + βEru (y+)+m a x d∈[δ,1]{(1 − d)[y + z − b + βE[rz (z,ˆ y) − ru (ˆ y)]]
+(1− d)λe maxθ∈R+[−kθ + p(θ)[−z + βE[
P
i rz (z,ˆ y)f(zi) − rz (z,ˆ y)]]]}.
Since rz(z;y) is non decreasing in z, it follows that ˜ rz(z2;y) ≥ ˜ rz(z1;y) for all z2 ≥ z1.
Hence, the operator T maps the set M(Ψ) into itself. Since M(Ψ) is a closed subset of
L(Ψ), it follows that the ﬁxed point s0 belongs to M(Ψ) as well. ¥
41DP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 3
(i) We want to prove that a Block Recursive Equilibrium exists. To this aim, we ﬁrst
construct a supposed equilibrium {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗} from the solution to the social
planner’s problem. Then, we verify that the putative equilibrium satisﬁes conditions
(i)—(iv) in Deﬁnition 1.
In the supposed equilibrium, the worker’s value from unemployment U∗(y) is set equal
to b + βEs0
u(ˆ y),w h e r es0
u is the derivative of the social planner’s value function s0 with
respect to the unemployment rate. The ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value from a match
V ∗(z;y) is set equal to y+z+βEs0
z(z;ˆ y),w h e r es0
z is the derivative of the social planner’s
value function with respect to g(z). The market tightness function θ
∗(x;y) is set equal
to q−1(k/(
P
i V ∗(zi;y)f(zi) − x)) for all x ≤ ˜ x(y);a n dθ
∗(x;y) is set equal to zero for
all x>˜ x(y). Finally, the worker’s search value function D∗(υ;y) and policy function
m∗(υ;y) are set equal to the maximum and the maximizer of p(θ
∗(x;y)) (x − υ).
By construction, the market tightness function θ
∗ satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (i).
Also by construction, the worker’s search value D∗ and policy m∗ satisfy the equilibrium








∗(zi;y)f(zi) − υ]},( A 1 2 )
and D∗(υ;y) is the maximum of the problem in (A12). Hence the tightness θ
∗
u(y) of
the submarket visited by unemployed workers satisﬁes the optimality condition (E3);
and the tightness θ
∗
z(z;y) of the submarket visited by employed workers satisﬁes the
optimality condition (E4). Since U∗(y) is equal to b + βEs0
u(ˆ y) and V ∗(z;y) is equal to
y + z + βEs0
z(z;ˆ y), the tightness θ
∗
u(y) also satisﬁes the necessary condition (P3) for the
optimality of the solution to the social planner’s problem. Since (P3) admits only one
solution, θ
∗
u(y) is equal to θ
0
u(y). Similarly, we can prove that θ
∗
z(z;y) is equal to θ
0
z(z;y)
and that d∗(z;y) is equal to d0(z;y).
Since θ
0
u(y) is equal to θ
∗











u(ˆ y)=b + βE[U
∗(ˆ y)+λuD
∗(U
∗(ˆ y); ˆ y))]. (A14)
Hence U∗(y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (iii). Similarly, we can prove that the
ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value from a match V ∗(z;y) satisﬁes the equilibrium condition
(iv).
(ii) We want to prove that any equilibrium is eﬃcient. To this aim, let {D∗,m ∗,U∗,V∗,d ∗,θ
∗}
denote a Block Recursive Equilibrium. Let s∗
u(y) denote the worker’s value of unemploy-
ment at the beginning of the separation stage, i.e. U∗(y)+λuD∗(U∗(y);y).L e ts∗
z(z;y)
denote the ﬁrm’s and worker’s joint value of a match at the beginning of the separation
stage, i.e. V ∗(z;y)+λeD∗(V ∗(z;y);y).L e tθ
∗
u(y) denote the tightness of the submarket
visited by unemployed workers, i.e. θ
∗
u(y)=θ
∗(m∗(U∗(y);y);y).A n d l e t θ
∗
z(z;y) de-
note the tightness of the submarket visited by workers who are employed at jobs with




Deﬁne the function r : Ψ → R as ru(y)u +
P
rz(z;y)g(zi),w h e r eru(y) is equal to s∗
u(y)
and rz(z;y) is equal to s∗
z(z;y). Given the function r, consider the problem (A6). For
each (y,u,g) ∈ Ψ,t h eo p t i m a lm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s˜ θu(y) satisﬁes the condition
k ≥ p
0(˜ θu(y)){y − b + βE[
P
i rz(zi;ˆ y)f(zi) − ru(ˆ y)]} (A15)
and ˜ θu(y) ≥ 0, with complementary slackness. Since rz(zi;ˆ y)=s∗
z(zi;ˆ y) and ru(ˆ y)=
s∗
u(ˆ y), ˜ θu(y) also satisﬁes condition (E4). Since (E4) admits only one solution, ˜ θu(y) is
equal to θ
∗
u(y). Similarly, we can prove that the optimal tightness ˜ θz(z;y) is equal to
θ
∗
z(z;y). And we can prove that the optimal job destruction probability ˜ d(z;y) is equal
to d∗(z;y).
Deﬁne the function ˜ r : Ψ → R as Tr.A sw ep r o v e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,˜ r belongs to the
set L(Ψ).A sw ea l s op r o v e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,t h ed e r i v a t i v e˜ ru(y) is equal to
˜ ru(y)= −kλu˜ θu(y)+
h
1 − λup(˜ θu(y))
i
[b + βEru(ˆ y)]+





z(zi;ˆ y), ru(ˆ y)=s∗
u(ˆ y) and ˜ θu(y)=θ
∗
u(y), the right hand side of (A16)
43is equal to the right hand side of (E5). Hence ˜ ru(y) is equal to s∗
u(y). Similarly, we can
prove that ˜ rz(z;y) is equal to s∗









Since it is a ﬁxed point of the operator T, r is equal to the social planner’s value function











Table 1: U.S. Quarterly Data, 1951:I—2006:II
uv h ue heu hee apl
Average .056 63.9 .452 .026 .029 84.2
R e l a t i v e S t d 1 2 . 21 3 . 57 . 5 67 . 0 34 . 1 5 1
Quarterly Acr .873 .905 .820 .692 .595 .761
Unemployment u 1 -.919 -.920 .777 -.631 -.250
Vacancies v – 1 .907 -.784 .661 .410
UE Rate hue – – 1 -.677 .664 .258
EU Rate heu – – – 1 -.289 -.480
EE Rate hee –––– 1. 1 7 3
Average Prod apl ––––– 1
Source: Own calculations using data from the BLS.
Table 2: Calibration Outcomes
Description (a) Baseline (b) P85 Target
β discount factor .996 .996 real interest rate
b home productivity .987 .987 home/mkt prod.
λu oﬀ the job search prob. 1 1 normalization
λe on the job search prob. .833 – EE rate
γ elasticity of p wrt θ .650 .220 reg. coef. of v/u on hue
k vacancy cost 1.77 2.84 UE rate
δ destruction prob. .011 .027 tenure distribution
μz average idios. prod. 0 .371 normalization
σz scale idios. prod. 1.17 – EU rate
αz shape idios. prod. 4 – tenure distribution
μy average agg. prod. 1 1 normalization
σy std. agg. prod. 1.52 1.36 std. average prod.
ρy autocorr. agg. prod. 0.76 0.76 std. average prod.
45.
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Table 3: Productivity Shocks
uvv u ve hue heu hee apl
R e l a t i v e S t d 1 0 . 54 . 0 66 . 7 41 1 . 72 . 9 88 . 7 98 . 6 6 1
Quarterly Acr .837 .650 .771 .792 .775 .762 .792 .778
Unemployment u 1 -.812 .877 -.974 -.969 .971 -.970 -.971
Vacancies v –1 -.458 .890 .909 -.894 .895 .901
Vac for Un vu – – 1 -.747 -.746 .749 -.786 -.756
Vac for Emp ve – – – 1 .990 -.957 .999 .988
UE Rate hue –––– 1 - . 9 7 0 . 9 8 8 . 9 9 9
EU Rate heu ––––– 1 - . 9 5 4 - . 9 7 2
EE Rate hee –––––– 1. 9 8 6
Average Prod apl ––––––– 1
Table 4: Productivity Shocks in P85
uv h ue heu hee apl
Relative Std .667 2.78 .742 0 – 1
Quarterly Acr .826 .726 .770 1 – .771
Unemployment u 1 -.946 -.974 0 – -.974
Vacancies v – 1 .994 0 – .994
UE Rate hue – – 1 0 – .999
EU Rate heu ––– 1 – 0
EE Rate hee ––––––
Average Prod apl ––––– 1
49.
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